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Abstract and Keywords
For Augustine, eternal goods are the virtues and goods of
genuine friendship as they will exist in eternity—as the full
expression of love for God and neighbor-love. This chapter
considers such goods in their plurality and temporality. That
is, it treats them as human beings are able to comprehend and
pursue them—and sometimes even obtain and experience
them—in this life. To do so, this chapter revisits Augustine’s
letters to Ecdicia and Macedonius to take a closer look at
where each succeeded and failed in their pursuit of higher,
eternal goods. Augustine’s vision of obtaining eternal goods
involves a process in which the practice of virtues in this life
begins to mirror more directly the way virtues will exist in
eternity. The chapter also highlights elements of Neoplatonism
in Augustine’s theory of the virtues that shed new light on his
understanding of the relationship between religion and
society.
Keywords: virtues, friendship, eternity, Neoplatonism, love of God, neighborlove, religion and society

We now reach the summit of our study of the hierarchy of
goods found in Augustine’s letters and sermons. After chapterlong consideration of the three representative temporal goods
—marriage and family, public office, and wealth—we now turn
to their counterpart, the eternal goods. Three questions will
guide our examination of them in this chapter: what are
eternal goods? How do they relate to the classification of
goods we saw in Chapter 1? And, finally, how does one obtain
them? The majority of the chapter will be devoted to this third
question.

5.1. Letter 220 to Boniface
Augustine’s correspondence with the military commander
Boniface—whom we met in Chapter 3—provides a compressed
definition of eternal goods that will serve as our starting point.
Boniface was a Christian friend of Augustine, serving as
military commander overseeing the protection of Roman Africa
during the volatile early decades of the fifth century. His
career was cut short when he fell into a conspiracy centered
on rival generals Flavius Aetius, Flavius Constantius Felix, and
the empress Galla Placidia.1 Boniface formed his own army
and for two years fought against Roman troops sent from Italy
to defeat him. In the middle of this rebellion (c.428 AD),
Augustine wrote to him, imploring him to return to his role
and fulfill his obligation to (p.131) protect Africa from the
Vandals (Letter 220). Augustine identifies the cause of
Boniface’s rebellion as rooted, ultimately, in the condition of
his soul: it is disordered love for the temporal goods of wealth
and public office (and of the power associated with these
goods) that has led Boniface to make bad use of them and to
fail to fulfill his obligation to love and protect his neighbors.
Augustine advises Boniface to reorient his desires and
motivations for action toward higher goods. Rather than being
motivated solely by desire for “the wellbeing [salus] of [his]
mortal body … victory over human enemies, honor, temporal
power, and the rest,” Boniface must attend to:

the wellbeing of the soul, together with the immortality
of the body, the strength of justice, victory over the
hostile passions, glory, honor, and peace for eternity … It
is these that you must love, these you must desire, these
you must seek by any means you can. Give to the poor
for the sake of winning and keeping these [eternal]
goods; pour out your prayers, practice fasting as you are
able without impairing your physical health. Do not love
the goods of this earth, however plentifully you may
possess them. Make use of them in this way: do much
good with them, but no evil for their sake. All such goods
will perish, but good works will not perish, even those
achieved with goods that are perishable.2
In the final sentences of the letter, we find Augustine’s familiar
distinction between virtues of good use and renunciation.
Boniface, as we learned in Chapter 3, was a man who
understood this distinction and was eager to pursue the socalled higher virtues of renunciation by abandoning “secular
affairs” in order to pursue a contemplative life, far away from
military service.3 Augustine advises him to remain in the
military for the sake of the community’s safety, but to practice
the virtues of celibacy and poverty while in public office.
Boniface, Augustine says, should remain there and fight visible
enemies while monks battle invisible ones through prayer—
teaming up to promote both the temporal and eternal
wellbeing of the people.
Yet, in the excerpt from Letter 220 just cited, we find a
different Boniface, a man who has relinquished his previous
desires for a life of pecuniary simplicity and continence, and
has instead plunged himself into an inordinate love affair with
temporal goods without regard to the social or spiritual needs
of himself or the community he is responsible to protect. The
language of Augustine’s advice in Letter (p.132) 220
suggests that Boniface needs a firm reminder of the
superiority of the interior goods (virtues) over exterior ones.
Thus, in this exhortation we find a compressed answer to all
three of our guiding questions: what are eternal goods? How
do they fit into the classification of goods? And how does one
obtain them?

Augustine tells Boniface that eternal goods are imperishable:
goods not subject to the physical limits of bodily health or
decay. With Augustine’s relationship to the ancient
philosophical distinction between external goods and virtues
already established in Chapter 1, it seems plausible to read the
distinction here between temporal and eternal goods as one
more expression of the distinction between external goods and
virtues—and its corresponding picture of happiness. Yet Letter
220 does not bear this all the way out. The list of eternal goods
Augustine offers Boniface in this passage does include virtues,
such as justice; yet it also includes eternal forms of temporal
goods, such as the immortality of the body, and, perhaps more
surprisingly, of some of the temporal goods relevant to
Boniface’s role and obligations such as eternal honor, glory,
and peace. So we find that, for Augustine, among the eternal
goods are the virtues and also the replenished, imperishable
forms of many of the temporal goods—namely, the intrinsic
temporal goods of health and friendship. (Remember that
health names the first form of friendship between body and
soul, on Augustine’s account. Thus, immortality denotes a
variety of spiritual health that is both embodied and eternal.)
The notion that virtues have everlasting value is commonplace
among ancient philosophers, especially the Stoics and
Platonists with whom Augustine was most familiar.4 Yet the
notion of an eternal version of external goods, and their
relationship to one’s virtues, is rarer among ancient
philosophers, and is extremely complicated conceptual terrain.
Augustine’s own unique view is that eternal (p.133)
happiness consists of both virtue and an eternal form of the
two preeminent external goods of health and friendship.5 We
will return to this in a moment.
In this compressed presentation of eternal goods in Letter 220
we also find that the virtues are both the way toward obtaining
eternal goods and are themselves eternal goods. Augustine
exhorts Boniface to “win and keep” eternal goods by
cultivating particular virtues—almsgiving, fasting, making
good use of temporal goods. These are the means to desire,
seek, and possess eternal goods. This formulation parallels
Augustine’s account of virtues and eternal goods in Book 19 of
The City of God (written at the same time):

[God] has given to men certain goods appropriate to this
life. These are: temporal peace, in proportion to the
short span of a mortal life, consisting in bodily health
and soundness, and the society of one’s own kind; and all
things necessary for the preservation and recovery of
this peace. These latter include those things which are
appropriate and accessible to our senses, such as light,
speech, breathable air, drinkable water, and whatever
the body requires to feed, clothe, shelter, heal, or adorn
it. And these things are given [by God] under a most fair
condition: that every mortal who makes good use of
these goods suited to the peace of mortal men shall
receive ampler and better goods, namely the peace of
immortality and the glory and honor appropriate to it, in
an eternal life made fit for the enjoyment of God and of
one’s neighbor in God. He who uses temporal goods ill,
however, shall lose them, and shall not receive eternal
goods either.6
This passage reveals that, at the most rudimentary level,
eternal goods are obtained when temporal goods are put to
good use in the maintenance of temporal wellbeing both for
oneself and one’s community. In this way, eternal goods are
both the virtues of good use and some replenished version of
temporal goods offered to human beings as a reward for virtue
in the afterlife.

Still these shorthand formulations of the way to obtain eternal
goods through the life of virtue in Letter 220 and City of God
19 require more explanation. What precisely does the good
use of temporal goods entail, for Augustine? How does the
distinction between virtues of renunciation and virtues of good
use fit in? We do not find much in these texts regarding
Augustine’s distinction (p.134) between the virtues from
good use of temporal goods in the formation of the narrower
circles of oikeiōsis (e.g. marriage/family, public office, wealth)
and the virtues from renunciation of these same goods in the
formation of alternative forms of community (e.g. monastery,
church). Perhaps this lack is rooted in what Augustine knows
implicitly about his direct audiences and the virtues most
relevant to their lives. Or perhaps we should not drive a major
wedge between these two classes of virtues, for, on
Augustine’s account, even the renunciation of a temporal good
is its own sort of higher use of that good. Either way,
Augustine ranks these virtue classes hierarchically, and one
would expect to find some correspondence of their ranking in
their relationship to eternal goods. And, as we have seen again
and again, in Augustine’s eyes, good use of temporal goods
requires something more than maintenance of physical
security: good use also entails recourse to a spiritual
conception of wellbeing. The primary feature of the good use
of temporal goods is a return to the very source of these goods
in God, both for oneself and for those in one’s community.
Neither of these texts spells out the details of this crucial
aspect of good use.
Usually discussion of Augustine’s view of eternal goods turns
into discussion of eternal good—that distinctively Platonic
ontological simplification of humankind’s highest good,
happiness, found in absolute unification with the good itself.7
While this view of eternal good is undoubtedly present in
Augustine’s writings—notably in Letter 155, which we will
turn to later in this chapter—I want here to focus on eternal
goods in their plurality and temporality. That is, taking my cue
from Letter 220, I will consider eternal goods as human beings
are able to comprehend and pursue them—and sometimes
even obtain and experience them—in this life.8

(p.135) To paint a fuller picture of Augustine’s conception of
eternal goods we must examine his responses to the lives of
people who pursue, and sometimes obtain, them. In the next
two sections of this chapter, I will revisit two individuals
(Ecdicia and Macedonius) from previous chapters and take a
closer look at their successes and failures in pursuing and
obtaining these goods. In the final section I will offer a
general, moral-psychological picture of Augustine’s account of
the way one obtains eternal goods through the good use of
temporal goods and virtues. In brief, Augustine’s picture of
obtaining eternal goods entails a process in which the practice
of the virtues in this life begins to mirror more directly the
way the virtues will exist in eternity. This process—which
Augustine calls the perfection of the virtues—entails a return
to God as the dual source of all virtues and temporal goods.
Returning to God as the source perfects the virtues and
creates a path to eternal goods.

5.2. A Failed Pursuit: Letter 262 to Ecdicia
The life of Ecdicia is a representative case of how truly
difficult it is to comprehend, pursue, and obtain eternal goods
on Augustine’s account.9 Her life is a perfect foil for Boniface’s
superficial attachment to temporal goods. Augustine identifies
Ecdicia’s error not as her desire for a soft, comfortable life,
but rather in her idealization of the spiritual life. In Letter 262,
Augustine recognizes and affirms her desire to pursue eternal
goods through her practice of the so-called higher virtues of
renunciation. What he warns against are the hidden forms of
self-praise that lie at the core of her motivation and spoil her
pursuit of eternal goods. Augustine criticizes her motives
because of how their corollary actions affect those closest to
her—those whose temporal and eternal wellbeing she is
responsible for tending.
(p.136) If the essence of obtaining eternal goods consists in
clinging to God, as Augustine clearly thinks it does, then it
makes sense to think of the virtues of renunciation as
providing a more direct and unadorned route toward this
goal.10 Yet, as we have seen in previous chapters, there are no
short-cuts to the highest good. And the straightforward path of
renunciation does not always lead one toward God, and thus
not toward eternal goods.

Augustine identifies three issues in Ecdicia’s pursuit of eternal
goods.11 First, Ecdicia decides to practice the virtue of marital
continence before her husband agrees to join her. In the letter,
Augustine affirms that marital continence is “a good which
surpasses marital chastity.”12 For chastity, the reader will
remember, is the virtue associated with the good use of sex in
marriage for the promotion of the two primary marital goals of
faithfulness (fides) between the spouses and offspring
(proles).13 Augustine also notes that Ecdicia’s husband has
joined her in the practice of this higher-level marital virtue,
and he congratulates them for their shared commitment.
Nevertheless, Augustine chides Ecdicia for initially depriving
her husband of the “marital debt of her body” well before he
had joined her in the vow, citing Paul’s admonition in 1
Corinthians 7 to: “[l]et the husband pay to his wife the debt he
owes her; likewise let the wife pay to her husband the debt she
owes him. A wife does not have authority over her body, but
her husband does; likewise a husband does not have authority
over his body, but his wife does” (1 Corinthians 7:3–4). Rightly
ordered love for the good of marriage, Augustine insists, must
involve both care for physical needs and a yielding of bodily
authority in mutual love.
The second issue raised in Letter 262 relates to Ecdicia’s
decision to pursue the virtue of poverty by donating all of her
and her husband’s possessions to the poor without consulting
her husband. This issue is more problematic than the first, in
Augustine’s mind, because the explanation for her action is not
that she moved toward a virtue more quickly than her
husband, but that she made a rash and unilateral decision
without her husband’s consent—which is at odds with the
demands of a virtuous marriage. The good obtained through
(p.137) her self-willed poverty has been, in this case,
cancelled out by the damage caused to her friendship and
union with her husband.14 “You need not repent over having
given your property to the poor,” Augustine tells her, “but over
not having wanted to have him [your husband] as a partner
and guide in your good work.”15 For even if her husband was
“moving rather sluggishly through distributing goods more
generously,” Ecdicia’s role as wife and mother required that
she should have tried first to coax her husband respectfully
toward works of mercy.16 Then, “the two of you would have
done in harmonious love much more wisely and much more
fittingly and decently what you thoughtlessly did alone.”17

The third issue centers not on a specific virtue, but rather on
an aspect of the lifestyle associated with these higher virtues
of renunciation. Ecdicia, after making the vow of marital
continence, has abandoned the traditional attire of a married
woman in favor of wearing a widow’s dress (presumably the
garb worn by those who had taken the vow of Christian
widowhood, such as Juliana and Proba). It appears that it was
this, more than the lack of sex or lost possessions, that upset
Ecdicia’s husband—perhaps because it caused him public
embarrassment. In Augustine’s letter, this third issue is
identified as the central reason that her husband has taken up
with another woman. Indeed, Ecdicia’s choice of attire
represents, on Augustine’s analysis, her general confusion
about how to obtain eternal goods. Her failure in the practice
of the higher virtues, claims Augustine, results from a failure
to love her husband. In the language of the letter, Ecdicia has
failed to care for her husband’s “temporal [and] eternal
wellbeing.”18
To understand Augustine’s claims about eternal goods in this
letter, we must keep in view his understanding of how one
should pursue eternal goods within the context of social and
political responsibility. Leaders, he claims, should use
temporal goods in order to tend the temporal and eternal
wellbeing of those within the orbit of their care and friendship.
This is the avenue for obtaining the greater, imperishable
goods. Ironically, in Ecdicia’s fervent attempt to minister to
the temporal wellbeing of the poor by giving away their
possessions, she has neglected both the “temporal wellbeing”
of her son and the “eternal wellbeing” of her husband. “Both
of you [you (p.138) and your husband,]” Augustine writes to
Ecdicia, “should have regulated together what you should
store up in heaven and what you should leave for the needs of
this life for yourselves and your son, so that others are not fed
while you are suffering.”19 Augustine closes the letter by
exhorting Ecdicia to think more carefully about the essential
connection between her fragile marriage and her son’s eternal
wellbeing, “Your son needs oneness of heart between you and
your husband.”20

Augustine’s exhortation to Ecdicia in Letter 262 is not
intended as a browbeating. He is not saying: no, Ecdicia, you
cannot really pursue the highest good, you are stuck in
married life, stop trying so hard. Augustine is simply clarifying
for Ecdicia that her roles as wife and mother—along with the
correspondent duties and virtues of these roles—amount to a
normative context for her pursuit of eternal goods. In cases of
competing goods, the duties of love owed to her husband and
son must trump the pursuit of ascetic virtue. Furthermore,
when a virtue fractures household goods, it is no longer really
a good at all for the one who practices it (even if it provides
goods for others, as in the case of Ecdicia’s poverty). Ecdicia’s
error was to so misconceive the higher virtues that she
created a false conflict between them and the temporal goods
of the household. Much like a photographic negative, this
picture of how to obtain eternal goods reminds us of
Augustine’s claims about the unity of the love commandments
(to love God and neighbor) and the obligation of social and
political leaders to obey these commands in the context of
their roles and the virtues associated with the excellent
performance of their role-specific obligations.
The litmus test of one’s love for the highest good, Augustine
insists, is the quality of one’s relationship to the neighbors
whom God has placed in one’s life.21 Preaching on one of his
favorite texts, 1 John 4:20 (“If anyone says, ‘I love God,’ and
hates his brother, he is a liar; for he who does not love his
brother whom he has seen cannot love God whom he has not
seen”), Augustine sounds a familiar note of the unity of the
two love commands:
(p.139) One wing is, “You shall love the Lord” … But
don’t stick to one wing; because if you think you’ve got
one wing, you haven’t even got that. “You shall love your
neighbor” … I mean, if you don’t love the brother you
can see, how can you love the God you can’t see? Add
the other wing; in this way you will fly, in this way you
will remove your cravings from earthly things, and fix
your love [caritas] on heavenly goods.22

Ecdicia’s failure, we can then conclude, is found on the
horizontal axis of the return to the highest good: a failure to
love rightly the neighbors that God has placed within her
circle of care and friendship. This account of Ecdicia’s failure
echoes Augustine’s conception of God as highest common
good (bonum commune), observed in Chapter 3, and the
connection between the upward and outward axes of ascent to
God that we focused on in Chapter 4.
Augustine’s advice to Ecdicia highlights the responsibility of
Christian leaders to use temporal goods (even in the
renunciation of those goods) to promote both the temporal and
eternal wellbeing of oneself and those under one’s care, on the
model of the expanding circles of oikeiōsis. He reminds her
that, “the relation of strangers is not the same as that of
persons bound together in a society … the relation of parents
to their children is not the same as that of children to their
parents. Finally, still other is the relation of husband and
wife.”23
It is clear from this letter who Augustine thinks wears the
spiritual mantle in Ecdicia’s household: Ecdicia, the ascetic
overachiever. Augustine tactfully employs the language of
Roman decorum throughout the letter, urging Ecdicia to play
her domestic role in showing respect for her husband’s
authority and, even more importantly, to try to repair their
fragile marital friendship.24 Lest Augustine’s appeals to her
husband’s authority be construed as uncritical (p.140)
patriarchalism, Augustine also clearly acknowledges the
spiritual authority Ecdicia exercises in the family, and he urges
her to be accountable for this role.25 His appeal to Ecdicia’s
spiritual authority should not be interpreted as a type of
enforced quietism, for it is clear how interwoven the social and
spiritual forms of wellbeing are for Augustine in the letter:

But was your action of refreshing the bodies of the poor
by more generous alms as great a good as the harm you
caused by tearing the mind of your husband away from
so good a commitment [to marital continence and also to
Christianity]? Or should anyone’s temporal wellbeing
have been more precious to you than his eternal
wellbeing? If, while thinking of more ample works of
mercy, you postponed giving your possessions to the
poor in order that your husband might not be
scandalized and be lost to God, would God not credit you
with giving more abundant alms? … For, if bread shared
with a poor person has great weight in heaven [i.e. it is
an eternal good], how much weight ought we to think
mercy has there, by which a human being is snatched
from the devil, who is like a roaring lion seeking
someone to devour [?].26
Ecdicia’s lofty pursuit of eternal goods has put her husband’s
eternal wellbeing in jeopardy. Ecdicia’s unilateral ascent
toward the highest good has left her husband’s relationship
with God fractured. Still, the blame in this passage has no air
of disrespect for Ecdicia’s spiritual ambition. It is rather a
warning shot—a call for Ecdicia to take responsibility for her
own power of spiritual authority. Not knowing the full details
of either side of the case, we are unable to identify Ecdicia’s
husband’s role in the failed relationship. We can assume that
he is responsible for his sin of adultery and has a share in the
blame for their separation. Nevertheless the lessons and
insights about virtue offered to Ecdicia stand on their own, in
isolation from her husband’s failures and any absolution that
his guilt might provide for her faults.
(p.141) Ecdicia’s failure to obtain genuine eternal goods is
rooted in multiple failures. And since her disorderedly virtuous
action reveals disordered motivation, Augustine exhorts her to
change her disposition and action:
Put on humility of mind … and write to him [your
husband] a letter of apology, asking pardon for having
sinned against him because you did what you thought
you should do concerning your property without his
advice and consent. You need not repent over having
given your property to the poor but over not having
wanted to have him as a partner and guide (participem
et moderatorem) in your good work.27

We see here Augustine playing with the language of
submission and equality (“as a partner and guide”) in his
exhortation. We also find Augustine’s trademark emphasis on
the virtue of humility as the necessary groundwork for the
practice of the other virtues. As we saw in Chapter 2, the
virtue of humility (humilitas) ranks higher than all of the
highest ascetic virtues (e.g. celibacy, continence) and is
necessary for the perfection of the other virtues.28 (We will
return to this later.) We also see an emphasis on confession of
sin and forgiveness as preconditions for acquiring humility. In
Ecdicia’s case confession takes on the concrete practice of
writing a letter of apology to her husband.29 Putting on
humility requires self-examination, confession of sin, and,
perhaps most importantly, the externalization of her inward
process through the writing of an apology letter to her
husband whereby she would also seek forgiveness.30
Greater goods or higher virtues are no longer such if they do
not upbuild the friends and communities for whom one is
responsible. Ecdicia’s choice of wardrobe reveals the content
of her motivations more clearly than any of her other actions—
not to mention a certain neglect for the spouse within her
circle of oikeiōsis. She dons the appearance of ascetic virtue
without achieving the interior disposition necessary to perform
her role as mother and wife in a way that helps her obtain
eternal goods.

(p.142) As we noted in Chapter 2, the root of Ecdicia’s
dilemma, in Augustine’s view, is that she cannot discern
between the highest good and her own idea of the good. Or, to
put the point more precisely, Ecdicia cannot discern between
loving the good (a life of true virtue) and her own idea of what
loving the good looks like. For Augustine, this conflation is a
form of spiritual self-deception that everyone succumbs to on
some level. So, in many ways, Ecdicia’s problem is the
opposite of Boniface’s. Boniface needs to lift his mind from the
pursuit of temporal goods as a mere means toward pleasure
and power, and to cultivate desire for the imperishable goods
of the virtues directed toward God. Only by detaching his
desire from temporal goods can he return toward God and
begin the process of purification and healing for his desires.
Ecdicia, on the other hand, has progressed to the point where
she is quite ready to abandon temporal goods with fervor. And
yet she seems no closer to the goal of the highest good than
does Boniface. Ecdicia is more in love with her own idea of
virtuousness than she is with practicing genuine virtue—which
is inherently performative, always culminating in
demonstrative love of God and neighbor. Just as Boniface
needs to be detached for a time, or perhaps permanently, from
his unhealthy love of certain temporal goods, so too Ecdicia’s
love for her own virtuousness must be detached, cleansed,
purified, and healed.31
In Letter 262 we recognize for the first time that, for
Augustine, the return to the highest good is always a twofold
return—the perfection both of one’s love for temporal goods
and one’s own virtues. Each requires a process of
dispossession and reorientation of goods toward their final end
in God so that they may be seen clearly, appreciated fully, and
used properly in temporal life. Only through this process of
double return can one learn to use temporal goods and virtues
“as if [he] were not using them,” as Augustine tells Boniface in
Letter 220.32 This attitude of nonpossessive desire for one’s
own goods is the telltale sign of a mature love for them. It
reckons every good as a (p.143) gift and follows each one
toward its source in the highest good. Thus love for the
highest good entails a perfection of one’s love for both
temporal goods and virtues. Ecdicia gets the first part right—
as evidenced by her prowess in renunciation—yet she misses
the second return completely.

The pursuit of eternal goods, on Augustine’s account, is
difficult to theorize because it always refracts through the
particular goods that make one’s roles, obligations, and
relationships possible. For Ecdicia, this pursuit centers on her
marriage, motherhood, household, wealth, and the many
virtues associated with the use or abandonment of these
goods. This sheds new light on Augustine’s conception of
properly ordered love. For, as we have seen, the alignment of
intensity of desire and degree of goodness are highly
contextual and dependent on one’s setting, vocation, and
circumstances. Ascent toward the good and descent into social
and political life are not discrete movements of the soul, in
Augustine’s eyes, for the soul is always partially clinging to the
highest good in the midst of one’s life and practice of the
virtues. As mentioned at the outset of this section, although it
seems that the virtues of renunciation (e.g. marital continence,
poverty) might be a more direct route toward the good, given
the intrinsically social nature of happiness, on Augustine’s
view, and its organization in the circles of oikeiōsis, it is all too
possible to aim for an eternal good in ascetic abandonment of
a temporal good, and to end up missing the good entirely. It is
now time to consider a successful case: a political official who
obtains eternal goods through the practice of the virtues
associated with his office.

5.3. The Perfection of the Political Virtues: Letter 155 to
Macedonius
Macedonius, the reader will recall from Chapter 3, was
imperial vicar of Africa during the years AD 413–414, in which
he oversaw the administration of justice in all of Roman
Africa.33 During his (p.144) tenure at this post Augustine
appealed to him for clemency on behalf of a criminal
condemned to capital punishment. Through their exchange of
letters we learn that Macedonius grants the appeal, and
Augustine writes to thank him and to congratulate him on his
decision in Letter 155. The letter turns into an extended
discussion of the relationship between virtue and happiness—
specifically as it is practiced and experienced in the life of a
political ruler. In that letter we also learn that Macedonius has
read the first three books of The City of God, which Augustine
sent to him, and that he is both eager and capable of receiving
the text’s philosophical meditation on happiness.

Letter 155 is Augustine’s most detailed account of the way
eternal goods are obtained through the practice of the
virtues.34 Augustine recognizes that Macedonius is hungry for
such higher-level philosophical advice and suggests that he is
right on the threshold of obtaining the imperishable goods
constitutive of eternal happiness. Augustine declares that
Macedonius’ life exhibits true longing for the heavenly
commonwealth—the highest level of oikeiōsis—and the true
friendship with God and neighbor that flow from there:
I can tell that your spirit is panting for God’s heavenly
commonwealth, inspired by a love of eternity and of
truth and of love itself … I see you approaching near to
it, and I embrace you as you burn to possess it. True
friendship also flows from there; and this ought not to be
weighed by temporal goods, but drunk with freely given
love.35
Elsewhere in the letter, Augustine also praises Macedonius for
practicing the political virtues (prudence, temperance,
courage, and justice) in his work as a public official—tending
to the wellbeing of the political community.36 Nevertheless, he
tells Macedonius that these political virtues—and the temporal
wellbeing they are aimed at preserving—must be informed by
the double commandment of love in order to be “perfected”
and made “real.”37 Or in other words, they require the double
commandment of love to be efficacious for obtaining eternal
goods.

Augustine urges Macedonius to continue pursuing God as the
source of all goods: both as the source of all temporal goods
and as (p.145) the source of his own virtues.38 It appears
Macedonius has been at least partially successful in making
the double return to God. And it is only by continuing this
double return, Augustine claims, that the political official’s
conception of wellbeing will be expanded from the merely
temporal to the eternal horizon, even as he begins to envision
what it might look like for him to use his office and its
associated obligations to tend the temporal and eternal
wellbeing of those under his care. Throughout Letter 155,
Augustine challenges Macedonius to be attentive to and
responsible for the end to which the people put the political
wellbeing he struggles to provide them.39 And while the goal
of tending the people’s temporal wellbeing is good, it does not
go far enough—it is too indeterminate. Practicing the political
virtues entails more than the physical health or security of the
political community, on Augustine’s view. Properly ordered
political virtues necessarily orient one toward higher goods.
Yet what are these higher goods? Is there a highest good?
Augustine thinks the political official cannot avoid these
questions if he is to practice the virtues necessary for doing
his job well.
A key reason that the temporal wellbeing promoted through
the political virtues is inherently indeterminate and unstable,
Augustine tells Macedonius, is that human beings often
mistake the source of happiness for something that consists
entirely in either temporal goods or virtues:

You can see, then, where you should look for the object
of everyone’s desire, whether they are learned or not.
Many fail, through error or pride, to learn where to look
for it, and where to receive it. Both types are criticized
together in one of the divine psalms: “those who trust in
their own virtue and who boast in the abundance of their
riches” (Psalm 49(48):6). This refers both to the
philosophers of the present age and also to those who
shun even such philosophy as that, saying that a people
is happy if they have sufficient earthly wealth. Therefore
we should seek virtue from the Lord our God who made
us, so that we can overcome the evils of this life; we
should also seek the life of happiness, so that we may
enjoy it after this life for eternity. Thus both in virtue and
in the reward of virtue “whoever boasts,” to quote the
apostle, “should boast in the Lord (2 Corinthians 10:17).
That is what we want for ourselves and for the city of
which we are citizens. The source of happiness is not one
thing for a human being and another for a city: a (p.
146) city is indeed nothing other than a like-minded
mass of human beings.40
This passage highlights why Augustine thinks a view of God as
the highest good is necessary for a genuine conception of both
individual and civic happiness. As it adapts Cicero’s
presentation of the Epicurean and Stoic views of happiness in
Tusculan Disputations, the passage also briefly illustrates
Augustine’s view of the limitations of a conception of
happiness wholly exhausted by either temporal goods or
virtue, or some combination of the two. The imperfection of
virtue, fragility of temporal goods, and magnitude of human
misery—considered cumulatively—challenge and destabilize
all conceptions of happiness that do not make reference to
eternal goods. The Stoic view that happiness consists solely in
virtue exhibits insensitivity to the limits that suffering places
on flourishing, as well as a prideful unwillingness to seek
happiness from a source outside of one’s own control. For
Augustine, only some conception of eternal happiness,
received directly from its source in the highest good, can do
justice to the combined force of our natural longing for
happiness, our intuition that it consists in both virtue and
temporal goods, and the magnitude of misery that human
beings can experience in this life.41

If civic happiness merely consists in the accumulation of
temporal goods, then Augustine’s claims about its inherent
indeterminacy and instability seem straightforward and
require little substantiation. This sort of political wellbeing
would be entirely subject to fortune. Yet Augustine recognizes
that the philosophically astute, and perhaps Stoic, political
readers among the intended audience of Letter 155 will not be
satisfied with such a quick argument for the necessity of a
guiding conception of God as the highest good and source of
true happiness. Such readers would assuredly respond that
civic happiness is not merely equivalent to the accumulation of
temporal goods (or, “temporary advantages,” for the Stoics, as
we saw in Chapter 1), but rather is these goods organized by
virtuous political officials for the cultivation of a virtuous
political community. This is undoubtedly a step up from a
materialist conception of civic happiness on Augustine’s view,
yet it still fails to perceive the true source of happiness.
For Augustine, if the political virtues are not referred to their
source in God they cannot be used in the right way to direct
people toward (p.147) true happiness. Without this upward
reference, on Augustine’s account, civic happiness, and the
political official’s virtues, remain imperfect and insubstantial.
Reference (referre) here can be understood as a continuously
renewed recognition that this life’s goods are contingent gifts,
and signals of something more than themselves.42 This helps
clarify what Augustine means when he tells social and political
leaders such as Boniface, Ecdicia, and Macedonius to tend
both the temporal and the eternal wellbeing of those under
their care. There is an ambiguous middle ground between
temporal and eternal happiness that virtuous Christian public
officials, such as Macedonius, must inhabit.
Augustine offers Macedonius the following exhortation, and
memorable snapshot, of what the twofold return to God will
require:

If you recognize the source of the [political] virtues you
have been given and give God thanks; if you use them
even in your secular position of honor to contribute to his
worship; if you inspire and lead those people under your
power to praise him both by living an exemplary
religious life and through the devotion you show to their
interests, whether by support or deterrence; if the only
reason that you want them, with your help, to live more
securely is so that they might win God, in whose
presence they will live happily; then, all of your virtues
will be real ones. They will develop and be perfected in
this way through the assistance of God, whose generous
gift they were. Then, without any doubt, they will bring
you to the truly happy life, which can only be eternal.43
(my own emphasis)
Notice that it is only by making the second return that Ecdicia
missed—i.e recognizing the source of one’s virtues and
exhibiting appropriate gratitude for them—that Macedonius is
able to “perfect” and “make real” his political virtues.
Recognition and gratitude enable (p.148) Macedonius to
“use” his virtues appropriately—that is, to help both himself
and others to return to God. Also notice the new motivational
end involved in recognizing God as the source of one’s virtue:
the goal of contributing to God’s praise. In this way Augustine
is reclaiming piety as the fifth political virtue, or, more
precisely, as the virtue that perfects the other political virtues.
In Letter 155 true piety is both true worship of God and also
obedience to the double commandment of love.
It should also be noted that Augustine’s exhortation to true
piety is not a call to proselytization on Macedonius’ part.
Augustine tells Macedonius to help inspire and lead those
people under his power “to worship God both by living an
exemplary religious life and through the devotion you show to
their interests.”44 Augustine is careful to express his respect
for the distinctive obligations associated with Macedonius’
role as political ruler.45
Augustine continues his presentation of the perfection of the
political virtues through true piety in a further description of
the political virtues as they will exist in eternity—that is, as
eternal goods:

One virtue alone will exist there [in eternal happiness]:
both virtue and the reward of virtue. As the man who
loves this says in the sacred discourse: “For me it is good
to cling to God” (Psalm 73:28). Both complete and
eternal wisdom, and also a life now fully happy will
consist in this. Now we will have reached the eternal and
supreme good; and it is the completion of our good to
cling to this forever. We might also call this practical
wisdom, because it will cling very prudently to the good
that it will never lose; and courage, because it will cling
very tenaciously to the good and will not be torn from it;
and moderation, because it will cling in purity to the
good, as it cannot now be corrupted; and justice,
because it will cling very rightly to the good, which it
deserves to serve.46
In this passage we find the ontological reduction of eternal
goods to a single eternal good, a topic of frequent focus
concerning Augustine’s view of eternal happiness.47 The
eternal good, on Augustine’s account, is the union of God as
highest good, eternal happiness, and the virtues as they will
exist in eternity—as the singular virtue of clinging to the
highest good through love. As has been pointed out (p.149)
by Robert Dodaro, this description of the political virtues as
they will exist in eternity mirrors Plotinus’ account of the
“purificatory virtues” found in Enneads I 2. There, in his
treatise on virtue, Plotinus provides a parallel description of
the four political virtues as they exist in the soul of the one
who ascends to a vision of the good itself.48
Like Plotinus’ account, Augustine emphasizes the fecundity of
the absolute good (its overflowing in creation) and the way
this fecundity relates to the inherently social nature of a
genuine encounter with the good. The soul that ascends
toward the true good wants others to share in this good with
it.49 On this view, there is genuine continuity between the
political virtues as they exist and are practiced now in
temporal life and as they exist in their perfected, eternal form.
Macedonius’ work in tending the political community’s
temporal wellbeing and practicing the political virtues has,
therefore, in Augustine’s eyes, prepared him to obtain eternal
goods.

Augustine also offers Macedonius a description of the political
virtues as they exist in transition—on their way toward
perfection—as plural manifestations in time of the single
virtue that constitutes the eternal good:
Moreover, even in this life there is no virtue except that
of loving what ought to be loved. Prudence consists in
choosing that, courage in allowing no hardships,
moderation in allowing no temptations, justice in
allowing no pride, to divert one from it. What should we
choose to love particularly, if not the one thing we can
find that is unsurpassed? This is God; and if in loving
anything else we make it preferable or equal to him, we
have forgotten how to love ourselves. The nearer we
approach to him, the better it is for us; for nothing is
better than him. (p.150) We approach him, however,
not by moving but by loving. We will have him nearer to
us the more we can keep pure the love that carries us to
him: he is not spread out or enclosed in physical space.
He is present everywhere, and entirely everywhere; we
can reach him then not by foot, but by character.
However, our character is usually judged not from what
we know, but from what we love. It is good and bad loves
that make good and bad characters … Let us do
everything we can, then, to bring to him also those whom
we love as ourselves; if, that is, we can realize that loving
ourselves means loving him.50
This translation of the political virtues into the idiom of the
one true virtue—a society of lovers clinging to the highest
good in eternity—is perhaps Augustine’s most exalted
presentation of the transformation of political virtues into
eternal goods. He offers it to a man mired in public affairs and
the daily legal administration of Roman Africa.

Augustine closes the letter to Macedonius with the highest
compliment paid to an individual to be found in all of his
writings: “Though you wore the belt of an earthly judge you
appeared to have your mind fixed on the heavenly
commonwealth.”51 This depiction of Macedonius’ mind
elevating his duties, virtues, and even his official uniform,
stands in profound contrast to Augustine’s admonishment of
Ecdicia for her choice of dress: “Even if your husband forced
you to wear the attire of a married woman and not that of a
widow … you could have had a humble heart in your proud
attire.”52
The perfection of the political virtues that Augustine describes
to Macedonius in Letter 155 can be summarized in this way:
the highest virtue is love of God, the highest good. Practice of
this virtue requires two different returns: a return to God as
the source of all temporal goods and as the source of one’s
virtues. By making this double return, the political leader
learns what true wellbeing consists in and is thus able to
promote the wellbeing of those under his care. The double
return also provides the political leader new motivational
goals for virtuous activity beyond the pursuit of his own
wellbeing (and that of the political community): love of God, as
the highest good, for his own sake; and the practice of the
political virtues for the sake of bringing praise and glory to
God who is the source of all excellence (virtue). In this way,
God is both praised as the source of one’s virtues and loved as
the source of all temporal goods.
(p.151) Conversely, Augustine warns Macedonius that his
virtues and the temporal happiness they provide for the
political community will turn out to be illusory if he does not
allow the double return to God to perfect his virtues:

Take all your virtues: all the prudence with which you try
to serve human affairs, all the courage with which you
allow no enemy’s wickedness to frighten you, all the
moderation through which you keep yourself from
corruption when surrounded by the rottenness of
contemptible human habits, all the justice which you use
to judge correctly in assigning to each his own. Suppose
that you employ all these virtues in toiling and struggling
[merely] for the physical security of those you want to do
well … If so, neither your virtues nor the happiness that
comes from them will be real … I want to say this: if any
of your governing, however informed by the virtues I
listed, is directed only to the final aim of allowing human
beings to suffer no unjust hardships in the flesh; and if
you think that it is no concern of yours to what end they
put the peace that you struggle to provide for them (that
is, to speak directly, how they worship the true God, with
whom the fruit of all peaceful life is found), then all that
effort towards the life of true happiness will not benefit
you at all. I appear to be rather shameless in saying
this.53
The language of this appeal is strong. In what sense is
Macedonius responsible for practicing true piety (true worship
of the true God) and cultivating it among the people? If this
were merely a matter of establishing Christianity as the
imperial cult, it seems peculiar that Augustine makes his
appeal in the complicated language of the perfection of the
political virtues. Rather, Augustine is employing a complex
theological and philosophical conception of virtue and
detailing the role piety plays in orienting a public official’s
practice of the political virtues toward their true end in God.
5.3.1. True Piety

Augustine’s correspondence with Macedonius presents his
most detailed account of true piety as the perfecting virtue
and as the fulfillment of the commands to love God and
neighbor. Read together, the letters (Letters 152–155) present
a picture of true piety (p.152) as an integrated complex of
the just praise that human beings owe to God as the source of
all goods and virtues, properly formed self-love, and just
treatment of the neighbor on the basis of his or her humanity
(see Letter 153 on capital punishment). Augustine concludes
his reflection on the perfection of the political virtues through
true piety by saying:

We ought therefore “to love God and our neighbor as
ourselves,” so that we will lead anyone we can to
worship God by comforting them with kindness, or
educating them through teaching, or restraining them
through discipline, in the knowledge that “all of the law
and the prophets hang on these two commandments” …
Here we have the practice of the virtues, there [in
eternal happiness] their result; here their labors, there
their reward; here their duties, there their goal … Piety,
therefore, that is the true worship of the true God, is
beneficial in every way. It protects against hardships in
this life, or else softens them; and it brings us to that life
and that security where we will suffer no more evil and
enjoy the supreme and eternal good. I urge you to
pursue it more perfectly and hold on to it with great
tenacity; I urge this on myself also.54
Here, at the end of Letter 155, Augustine pulls all the threads
of piety together in the double commandment of love and
offers an account of the way that love perfects and actualizes
the political virtues associated with tending the wellbeing of
the political community. True piety is fulfillment of the double
commandment of love, and functions like a Plotinian
purificatory virtue in reorienting the political ruler’s soul and
perfecting his virtues—turning them into eternal goods.

What does true piety consist in? Given Augustine’s claims in
Letter 155, it cannot involve the mere installation of
Christianity as imperial cult. True worship of the true God is
not liturgical practice in this case but, rather, the archetypal
virtue of love that orients everything that the political ruler
does in his office. The political official’s role holds him
accountable to a special aspect of this project of contributing
to God’s praise: referring the people under his care toward the
highest good through the example of his life and the devotion
he shows to their interests.55 This devotion, Augustine writes,
entails educating, disciplining, and protecting the people in
such a way that they are (p.153) drawn toward the highest
good.56 Augustine is keen to show “respect” for Macedonius’
office and its particular demands—which are all aimed at the
political community’s welfare.57 As we saw in Chapter 3, there
is a distinct difference between the roles of judge and bishop,
in Augustine’s mind, and the religious transformation of the
political sphere happens, if it happens at all, at the level of a
political ruler’s practice of the virtues associated with the
excellent performance of his office.
True piety also provides the political official with a new
motivation for virtuous action. Augustine offers Macedonius a
shorthand formulation of the idea in Letter 155:
Therefore we should seek virtue from the Lord our God
who made us, so that we can overcome the evils of this
life; we should also seek the life of happiness [from him],
so that we may enjoy it after this life for eternity. Thus
both in virtue and in the reward of virtue “whoever
boasts,” to quote the apostle, “should boast in the
Lord” (2 Corinthians 10:17).58

Augustine’s presentation of God’s praise as the motivational
goal necessary for an account of true virtue (the perfection of
the political virtues) and of a complete definition of happiness
has yet to be understood, or fully appreciated, by interpreters
of his thought. Reorienting one’s motivation toward God’s
praise is an essential step in the return to God as the source of
one’s virtues. Indeed, it functions as the motivational
counterpart of the grateful recognition of God as the source of
one’s virtues. Many interpreters have puzzled over
Augustine’s remarks about the necessity of true piety for true
virtue. Is the connection between piety and virtue mere
conceptual polemics, or genuine philosophical analysis of
virtue?59 In the next (p.154) section of this chapter, I propose
a fresh answer to this question by considering the details of
Augustine’s account of motivation for virtuous action. The
practice of true piety, for Augustine, entails the completion of
the practice of all the other virtues through a double return to
God as both source of temporal goods and virtues.

5.4. The Twofold Return to God: Praise and Love
To understand Augustine’s advice on obtaining eternal goods
in Letter 155 to Macedonius, we now need to take a closer
look at both movements of the return. First, we will look at the
return to God as source of virtue. This is the movement with
which Ecdicia had the most trouble. Judging by the details of
Augustine’s advice in Letter 155, Macedonius has made
significant progress on this leg. Second, we will consider what
it means to return to God as the source of all temporal goods.
The twofold return to God, in Augustine’s eyes, is a movement
of praise and love. Praise is the consummation of one’s return
to God as the source of one’s virtues. Love is the culmination
of desire, found in continually renewed awareness that life’s
goods are contingent gifts, and signals of something more than
themselves.

For as one’s praise [of God, the highest good] improves
and extends, so one’s love and affection increases in
fervor. And when this is the case, humankind cannot but
advance with sure and firm step to a life of perfection
and happiness. This, I suppose, is all we wish to find
when we (p.155) speak of the highest good for
humankind, to which all must be referred [referre] in life
and conduct. For the good plainly exists; and we have
shown by reasoning, as far as we were able, and by the
divine authority which goes beyond our reasoning, that it
is nothing else but God Himself. For how can any thing
be the highest good for a human being but that in
cleaving to which he or she is happy? Now this is nothing
but God, to whom we can cleave only by affection,
desire, and love.60
This passage highlights the symmetrical movement of praise
and love in one’s return to God. Indeed, for Augustine, praise
and love are the twin motivations necessary for the perfection
of virtue.
5.4.1. God as the Source of Virtue

Based on Augustine’s advice in Letter 155, we can say, in
shorthand, that eternal goods are obtained when one clings to
God as the highest good in the midst of using temporal goods
(and the virtues associated with their use or renunciation). Yet
how, precisely, does one so cling to God?

As the quotation above makes plain, it takes place at the level
of “affection, desire, and love.” In Chapter 2 we considered
Augustine’s distinction between virtues that characterize both
disposition (habitus) and action (opus), and those that
characterize disposition only. And to understand the moral
psychology behind Augustine’s account of obtaining eternal
goods, we must have his distinction between virtuous action
and motivation for virtuous action in view. After all, the goal
for virtuous activity is love of God and neighbor—and as we
saw in Letter 155, neighbor love and healthy self-love find
ultimate harmony in love for God as the highest good. Eternal
happiness, according to The City of God, consists in “perfectly
harmonious fellowship in the enjoyment of God, and of one
another in God.”61 Love of God is thus the highest virtue on
Augustine’s account and also the singular eternal good. Our
goal in this section is to unpack what it means for one to cling
to God as the highest good in the midst of moving about and
using so many goods in this life, including the virtues. In what
ways can God be the ultimate end of each of one’s virtuous
actions?
Loving God, the highest good, provides a twofold motivational
goal. It simultaneously represents loving the highest good for
oneself (p.156) (i.e. eternal happiness) and also loving God,
the good, for his own sake. The two goals come together at the
highest level of motivation for virtuous action. Given that
happiness is inherently social on Augustine’s view, as is the
practice of all the virtues and use of all temporal goods,
actions are always to be judged (admired or condemned) by
the community in which they are performed. In this way, virtue
is inherently tied to social practice and systems of praise and
blame.
This connection is beneficial insofar as it promotes
identification with the group’s morals and social
accountability. Yet it can result in two related problems, given
our keen ability to distinguish between an action and the
motivation for that action. In a penetrating analysis of Psalm
118(119):37—“Turn my eyes away that they may not see
vanity; give me life in your way”—Augustine brings this
distinction to the foreground:

When we do something good, what we have in view
matters a great deal. Any service we render is to be
evaluated not in itself but according to the end [finis] on
which we have our eye; we must consider not only if
what we do is good but also whether we are doing it for a
good purpose. The psalmist is asking that the eyes with
which we envisage the end of our virtuous actions may
be averted from vanity [uanitas], or, in other words, that
when he does something good, he may not fix his gaze on
vanity as the motive of his action.62
Social admiration and praise for virtuous action is not a bad
thing, on Augustine’s view, “for what can be more salutary for
people than to admire what they ought to imitate?”63 But, on
the other hand, what is “blameworthy is to make the attracting
of admiration the motive for one’s action, for this is to set
one’s sights on vanity.”64 And, what is more:
Among all vain human objectives, the vainest is winning
the praise of others. Many people reputed great in this
world have achieved their manifold great deeds with a
view to winning praise. They have been highly extolled in
pagan civilizations, these heroes who sought glory not
with God but in human estimation. For the sake of fame
and glory they have lived prudently, bravely, temperately,
and justly; they won praise indeed, but in attaining it
they received their reward: vain men won a vain prize.65
(p.157) This passage resonates with Augustine’s arguments
about the pride of Roman glory and the limits of pagan civic
virtue in Book 5 of The City of God. Yet something significant
appears in this passage that is not present in The City of God.
The vanity of making human admiration one’s sole motive for
virtuous action results in a social consequence harmful to the
wellbeing of the political community.

First, in Augustine’s exposition of Psalm 118(119), we find that
because glory is determined solely by the standards of praise
and blame within the community, it is subject to communal
recognition. This can be socially beneficial, as we noted, but it
also means that it is continually threatened by other
community members’ achievements, and memories of those
achievements, and thus becomes a competitive good. Because
of the lower-level motivation involved in the pursuit of human
glory, and because we can distinguish between motivation and
virtuous action, systems of competing glories engender a
social attitude of suspicion toward the hidden motivations that
might lie underneath another person’s virtuous action.
No one’s motives for virtuous action are entirely pure, in
Augustine’s view. And in the competition for glory, most people
instinctively project this moral-psychological gap—along with
the correspondent shame—onto other members in the
community. This is especially true when one is intent on
acquiring virtue for social praise. Glory requires comparing
oneself to, and measuring one’s own deeds by, the standard of
others’ conduct. Thus, virtuous actions motivated solely by the
reward of human glory quickly fall prey to a cycle of
comparison, conformity, interior shame, and external
suspicion.66

[A]s long as a person does not turn his eyes away to
prevent them from seeing vanity [i.e. making one’s sole
motive for virtuous action socially conferred glory], he
will suspect that what goes on in himself goes on in
others too. So, for instance, he thinks that his own
motives for worshipping God are theirs also, or he thinks
that another person does virtuous actions for the same
reason as he does. This happens because although other
people can see our actions, the end we envisage is
hidden. Hence the possibility of suspicion arises, and
someone may (p.158) take it upon himself to judge the
hidden motives of others. Such conclusions are generally
mistaken; and even if they are correct, the self-appointed
judge has no right to suspect something of which he is
ignorant. The Lord warns us against a suspicious
attitude … He tells us not to perform virtuous actions for
the sake of winning human praise from others … lest we
suspect people whom we see to live good lives, but
whose purposes [fines] we do not see, of being motivated
in their well-doing by some [bad] motive … God
commands us “Do not judge, lest you be
judged” (Matthew 7:1).67
Augustine’s claims in this exposition of Psalm 118(119) and
the cycle of comparison, conformity, shame, and suspicion cast
new light on his more well-known criticism of systems of civic
virtue oriented toward a conception of socially conferred glory
(as was especially the case in the Roman literature and
popular culture most familiar to him). Political glory and its
relationship to eternal goods appears as a prominent theme in
Augustine’s letters to the public officials Boniface, Darius,
Marcellinus, Volusianus, and Macedonius.
The passage above clarifies Augustine’s appeal to Macedonius
to make God’s praise the motivation of his practice of the
political virtues. This motivational reorientation is central to
the work of obtaining eternal goods and in returning to God as
the source of one’s virtues. Making one’s motive for virtuous
action God’s praise is an essential part of being released from
vanity (i.e. making social praise the overarching motive for
action) and suspicion of others’ motives. Seeking God’s praise
does not engender competition, as does humanly conferred
glory. God is the good itself, so there is no comparative edge
that one could possibly attain.

If it happens that a just person does attract human
praise in some degree, such praise must not be made
into the object of his or her actions. Praise must be
redirected to the glory of God, for whose sake truly good
people perform their good actions, because such people
become good not by their own powers but by God’s gifts
… The praise given by other people must not be the
purpose of our virtuous actions; let us rather correct
such praise and refer everything to the praise of God,
since whatever in us rightly deserves praise comes from
him.68
(p.159) The motivational goal of praising God remedies the
damaging effects of glory on civic virtue in two ways, for
Augustine.
First, by making one’s goal the love and praise of God, one
distinguishes between civic virtue and mere social conformity
and acknowledges God as the transcendent standard of
goodness to whom one is accountable (revealed by the dictates
of both conscience and Scripture). In the same exposition of
Psalm 118(119) Augustine details how a desire to act in
“conformity” with God as transcendent standard tempers the
dangers of social conformity.69
Appealing to God as transcendent standard of goodness entails
an assessment of one’s conduct in the light of one’s conception
of God as the highest good. This appeal highlights an
important aspect of the perfection of virtue, beyond seeing
God as source of one’s virtues and making God’s praise one’s
goal for the practice of virtue. The truly virtuous, Augustine
claims, think at least as much of their virtues’ imperfections
and outright vices as they do about their more stable virtues.70
The man of true virtue, who loves, believes and hopes in
God, attends more to those things in himself which
displease him than to those, if there are any, which are
pleasing to him or, rather, to the Truth [God]. Nor does
he attribute what is now pleasing in him to anything
other than the mercy of Him Whom he fears to displease.
To God he gives thanks for what is healed in him, and
pours out his prayers for those things which are as yet
unhealed.71

Holding oneself accountable to God as the standard of
goodness thus entails practices of self-assessment, confession
of one’s shortcomings, and resolve to change one’s
motivations and actions. These practices are an integral
component of the perfection of virtue, obtaining eternal goods,
and the return to God as the source of virtue. Such practices
continuously renew one with a sense of fallibility and
dependence on the good. Recall the essential role of selfexamination and confession of sin in Augustine’s advice to
Macedonius on whether to pardon the criminal. For a judge in
Macedonius’ position, practicing prudence, justice, and
mercifulness requires constant self-examination in light of God
as transcendent standard of goodness.
(p.160) This leads to the second way that making God’s glory
one’s goal for virtuous action remedies (or begins to remedy)
the cycle of glory that Augustine thinks is so corrosive of
genuine civic virtue. In the final paragraph of his exposition of
Psalm 118(119), Augustine presents a complete definition of
true piety’s relation to love of God and neighbor that parallels
what we found in Letter 155. He claims that the practices of
self-examination, confession, and repentance are all necessary
for cultivating genuine love of neighbor. Suspicion of base
motives, on Augustine’s account, is merely a way of lifting
one’s virtuous actions above another’s in the pursuit of a
limited supply of socially conferred glory. This form of
suspicion is a soul disease that can only be healed through the
remedy of genuine love (caritas) for the neighbor: “To enjoy
suspecting evil [motives] that one cannot see is a disease, but
there is a remedy, and that is love [caritas], which is never
jealous.”72

As we noted in Letter 155 to Macedonius, Augustine does not
think it possible to love the neighbor appropriately without
first loving God as one’s highest good. Augustine closes the
above exposition of Psalm 118(119) with a parallel claim about
the inherent unity between the love commands: “Look at me: I
have longed to love you [God] with all my heart, all my soul,
and all my mind, and my neighbor as myself.”73 We can now
see more clearly why this is the case, for Augustine. Loving
God as the highest good entails a recognition of God as the
source of one’s virtues, a reorientation of one’s motivation for
virtuous action toward the goal of God’s praise, and a critical
assessment of one’s shortcomings in the light of God’s
perfection. Thus, the two remedies for the pitfalls of social
glory (confession of sin and genuine neighbor love) work in
tandem.
By making God’s praise one’s motive for virtuous action, one is
freed from the cycle of comparison, conformity, shame, and
suspicion. To practice virtue for the sake of God’s glory is to
bring praise to the very source in which one’s excellence
participates. This is the appointed consummation of virtue, on
Augustine’s view, because virtue represents the very measure
of one’s participation in God. The culmination of virtue has
salutary effects on the whole network of social practices and
civic virtues that make up political life insofar as praise
remedies the deficiencies of the cycle of glory as a competitive
social good.
(p.161) It is important to note that, for Augustine,
recognizing God as the source of one’s virtues is a claim about
the ontology of one’s participation in the good—and not a
claim about a one-directional divine gift that wipes out human
agency. In the perfection of the political virtues there is no
competition between divine and human agency. Augustine’s
conceptual language for this leg of the return is that of
intimacy. The nearer one approximates to the source and
ground of one’s virtues, the nearer one approximates to
oneself. Fully realized agency is not autarkic, for Augustine.

Notice also that Augustine’s description of the perfection of
the virtues to Macedonius is erotic, in the Platonic and
Plotinian sense: a picture of one clinging to the good rather
than being annihilated by it.74 It is a dispossession that leads
to consummation. This vision of clinging, Augustine tells
Macedonius, must inform the practice of the virtues in time.
Thus, recognition of one’s virtues as divine gifts is central to
the way piety perfects the other virtues. Furthermore, this is
one of the reasons that true piety is necessary, on Augustine’s
account, for the other virtues to be used rightly in promoting
the community’s wellbeing. Only in this way can virtues be
perfected, made real, and motivated by freely given love for
God and neighbor without a privatization of love for one’s own
goods and virtues.
Augustine’s account of perfected political virtues and true
happiness in Book 5 of The City of God mirrors the final
paragraphs of Letter 155 to Macedonius. Although the
political official described in Book 5 of The City of God is
ostensibly an emperor, the analysis given there applies more
broadly to all godly public officials. Given that Augustine was
writing Book 5 and Letter 155 at the same time, and given the
details of the virtues and practices recommended here (e.g.
gentleness, pardon, punishment), one cannot help but wonder
if this passage refers to the concrete figure of Macedonius:75

[Political officials] are happy if they rule justly; if they
are not lifted up by the talk of those who accord them
sublime honors or pay their (p.162) respects with an
excessive humility, but remember that they are only men;
if they make their power the handmaid of His majesty by
using it to spread His worship to the greatest possible
extent; if they fear, love and worship God; if they love
that Kingdom which they are not afraid to share with
others more than their own; if they are slow to punish
and swift to pardon; if they resort to punishment only
when it is necessary to the government and defense of
the commonwealth, and never to gratify their own
enmity; if they grant pardon, not so that unjust men may
enjoy impunity, but in the hope of bringing about their
correction; if they compensate for whatever severe
measures they may be forced to decree with the
gentleness of mercy and the generosity of benevolence;
if their own self-indulgence is as much restrained as it
might have been unchecked; if they prefer to govern
wicked desires more than any people whatsoever; if they
do all these things not out of craving for empty glory, but
from love of eternal happiness; and if, for their sins, they
do not neglect to offer to their true God the sacrifice of
humility and contrition and prayer. We say that, for the
time being, such Christian emperors are happy in hope
and that, in time to come, when that to which we now
look forward has arrived they will be so in possession.76
Just as in Letter 155, here too we see all the steps of the
return to God as the source of one’s virtues coming together in
a single passage: first, we see recognition of God as the source
of one’s virtues; second, there is a reorientation of motivation
from human to divine glory; and third, we see the
corresponding practices of self-examination, confession, and
repentance. All three of these movements are necessary for
the perfection of the political virtues and the reception of the
eternal goods constitutive of eternal happiness. Furthermore,
in this passage we also find that it is through the work of
perfecting the political virtues that one avoids the pitfalls of
imperfect virtue—that is, the cycle of comparison, conformity,
shame, and suspicion associated with “empty glory.” We now
turn to the second aspect of the double return: love for God as
the source of all temporal goods.
5.4.2. God, the Object of Everyone’s Desire

Augustine’s exposition of Psalm 118(119) provides an
important parallel to his comments in Letter 155 to
Macedonius about God being the true “object of everyone’s
desire”:
(p.163) Not even for the sake of temporal health or
wellbeing must we do good, but for the eternal wellbeing
which is our hope. In that eternal wellbeing
unchangeable good will be ours to enjoy, the good that
will come to us from God, the good which will be God
himself.77
The goal, on this leg of the double return, is to follow the many
temporal goods we use back to their source in the good itself.
It is all too easy, Augustine preaches, to want goods without
ever advancing toward a desire for the good itself:
[M]any people cry to the Lord about riches they hope to
gain or losses they want to avoid, or for the wellbeing of
their nearest and dearest, or for the security of their
household, or temporal happiness, or worldly
advancement; or even perhaps just for bodily fitness …
Many people pray for these and similar things to the
Lord, but hardly anyone prays for the Lord himself.
Indeed, it seems quite easy for a person to want
something from the Lord without wanting the Lord
himself, as though anything he gives could be more
delightful than the giver.78
By ascending to a desire for the giver himself, one begins to
love God as the good in a “disinterested” way, Augustine says,
even as one begins to taste and obtain eternal goods in this
life.79
Augustine describes this “disinterested” and nonpossessive
love as an enlarging, stretching, and maturing of one’s
affection for temporal goods. Good use of temporal goods
requires this growth. For those who have reached this stage of
love:

Only God remains to them as the [true] object of their
desires, for they no longer love the earth. They love him
who made heaven and earth; they love him, and they are
not yet with him. Their desire is kept waiting so that it
may grow, and it grows that it may lay hold on its object.
It is no paltry thing that God will give to one who longs,
but Himself, who made all that exists; and no small effort
must a lover make to be capable of receiving so great a
good. Train yourself until you have a capacity for God;
long and long for what you will possess forever.80
(p.164) Augustine picks up this exhortation in his Homilies
on the First Letter of John and uses the striking image of a
stretched-out purse:
The entire life of a good Christian is a holy desire. What
you desire, however, you don’t yet see. But by desiring
you are made large enough, so that, when there comes
what you should see, you may be filled. For, if you wish to
fill a purse, and you know how big what will be given you
is, you stretch the purse, whether it is made of cloth or
leather or anything else. You know how much you are
going to obtain, and you see that your purse is small; by
stretching it you make it that much larger. This is how
God stretches our desire through delay, stretches our
soul through desire, and makes it large enough by
stretching it … This is our life – to be exercised
[exercere] through desire.81
The exercise of desire, for Augustine, entails many exercises
for assessing, refining, and reordering one’s desires toward
God. These practices result, Augustine preaches in this
passage, in an overall stretching out of one’s soul toward the
good. One’s soul must be made capacious in order to receive
such a supremely desirable end.

Just as we found in the return to God as the source of one’s
virtue, this return to God as source of all temporal goods is
difficult work, on Augustine’s account. Anyone undergoing this
exercise of desire understands that the good cannot be, or
cannot remain, a mere projection of one’s acquisitive selfinterest. Sometimes this training involves taking pleasure in
goods and following them up to their source through
gratitude. Other times the training requires periods of
deprivation (through abstinence or renunciation) in order to
sharpen or stretch one’s desire to make room for “so great a
good.” Still at other times the training requires patient
endurance of the loss of temporal goods. Loss provides an
opportunity to assess the quality of one’s love for the good
itself.
Death represents the ultimate loss of temporal goods.
Meditation on it, in Augustine’s view, provides a useful
exercise for shaping one’s relationship to the good, and for
motivating the twofold return. Recall this characteristic
passage from Augustine’s preaching on wealth:
Why are you so obsessed with these things [temporal
goods] as the only means of pleasure and satisfaction?
That’s not wellbeing. “His spirit will go out, and he will
return to this earth” (Psalm 146:4). There, that’s what
his wellbeing amounts to, “a mist that appears for a little
while” (p.165) (James 4:14). “His spirit will go out, and
he will return to earth.” Let a few years pass. Let the
river flow on as usual, hurrying past the graves of the
dead. Tell the difference if you can between the bones of
the rich and the bones of the poor. “When his spirit goes
out he returns to his earth.”82
Meditating on the inevitable fact of death is an opportunity to
recognize that one’s goods are not entirely one’s own. They
are, in an important sense, merely tokens of the highest good
to be used in the mysterious journey back to God. At the end of
one’s life, in Augustine’s eyes, one is implicitly being asked to
accept God as one’s only good.
If one clings tenaciously to God as the source of all goods in
this life, one’s manifold desires will eventually come to an end
in satiety:

Yet however richly endowed such a soul may be here on
earth, what will it be in the world to come, where God
feeds us? As long as we are still on pilgrimage here, what
we shall be cannot be told. And perhaps even here, when
we lift up our hands, we long for that ultimate satiety; we
long for that state where we shall be totally satisfied
with God’s lavish gifts so that all our needs will vanish
utterly, and we shall desire nothing; because whatever
we desire here, whatever seems most worthy of our love
here, will be available in its entirety.83
Augustine repeatedly emphasizes that this singular return of
love for God is not meant to obliterate love for other goods.
Indeed, love of God, in Augustine’s view, is an overarching
goal that can unify and order one’s smaller loves for lower
goods.
I am not saying that you should have no loves; I simply
want your loves to be properly ordered. Put heavenly
things before earthly, immortal things before mortal,
eternal things before transitory ones. And put the Lord
before everything, and not just by praising him, but also
by loving him. It is easy enough to give him preference
when it comes to praise. But … do you show different
priorities in your love from the preferences you showed
in your praise?84
It is important to note that one’s singular love for God should
not block out neighbor love—as was discussed in Chapter 4.
Augustine is (p.166) keen to emphasize that the stretching of
desire for the good always moves upward and outward:
Hence love itself is now practiced in good works of
charity, by which it stretches itself out to help the
neighbor in whatever way it can, and this is its breadth
… Hence love, which looks out for that which is common
rather than for what is private, is said not to seek the
things that are its own.85

On Augustine’s view the soul has suffered a primordial
contraction in original sin and part of the remedy for it
requires this stretching out toward God and neighbor. This
passage reminds us of Augustine’s claim in Letter 155 that
there is ultimately a hidden unity between love of God,
neighbor, and self that one can glimpse in this life.86 The
journey toward nonpossessive love of the good entails this
horizontal extension. This stretching prepares us for the
experience of God as the highest common good who will be
enjoyed in eternity not in solitude but in that “perfectly
ordered and perfectly harmonious fellowship in the enjoyment
of God, and of one another in God.”87 This fellowship
represents the culmination of the enclosing circles of oikeiōsis
and the consummation of all temporal goods and virtues in
eternal happiness. Augustine declares that Macedonius’ life
exhibits a true longing for this “heavenly commonwealth,” and
the true friendship with God and neighbor that flow from
there: “I can tell that your spirit is panting for God’s heavenly
commonwealth, inspired by a love of … love itself.”88
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